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COMMENTS
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES-
USE OF VIDEOTAPE IN THE COURTROOM
AND THE STATIONHOUSE
Manifestly judicial reform
is no sport for the short-winded.
-VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xix (1949)
INTRODUCTION: THE CRISIS IN THE COURTS
The courts and those who man them, the lawyers and judges, are con-
tinually faced with the need for utilization of new and varied techniques
and technology in order to meet the ever-changing needs of the society
for whose benefit they exist. This pressing need to innovate becomes
especially apparent in an era in which the courts are not fulfilling their
function as institutions for the promotion of justice. The volume of civil
cases has reached such proportions that huge backlogs are developing.'
This backlog in civil cases has a direct and proportional effect on the
criminal courts, since the size of the judiciary is limited.2
Means, both quantitative and qualitative, have been proposed to solve
these problems in judicial administration. A pure quantitative approach,
proposed by those who fear that any change in a time-honored system
of fundamental procedures would be a change for the worse, would simply
entail more judges, more lawyers, and more courtrooms. This proposal
cannot be seriously regarded as practical at this point in time, since, if we
were to double our number of courtrooms and judges over the next ten-
1. The average delay before trial in a civil case in Cook County is 61.7 months.
Wood, 5 Yrs. Average Age of Settled Lawsuits, Chicago Tribune, August 19, 1971,
§ 2B, at 2, col. 4.
2. Supra note 1. For a report on judicial reform from the National Confer-
ence on the Judiciary see Williamsburg Cradles Another Revolution-This One in
the Administration of Justice, 57 A.B.A.J. 421 (1971).
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year period, no significant reduction in the backlog would occur, as the
number of cases filed, at current rates, would also double.3
If a quantitative increase in the current system will not solve the prob-
lem of overcrowding in the courts, what improvements will be effective? 4
The suggestions are legion. Two recent proposals for change in the areas
of torts and domestic relations include the system of "no-fault" insurance5
and the "no-fault" divorce. 6 Both these suggestions have been the sub-
ject of controversy from various interest groups. No-fault insurance has
been the subject of past, and probably future, attack by those who have
3. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM (1969). Mr.
Frank indicates that of 80,000 cases pending in the federal courts, one-fourth
are only two to three years old; in the twenty-six year period from 1941 through
1967, the case backlog increased 170 percent; the current backlog in the New York
City civil court is over 150,000 cases, with 100,000 more being filed annually;
Los Angeles with 180,000 new filings each year has two and one-half times the
number of filings for the entire federal court system. Id. at 10-11.
4. "The remedy is not more judges but 'better housekeeping within the
judiciary itself.'" Id. at 5. Also see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SPEEDY TRIAL (1968).
5. See Hofeld, Toward Understanding and Improving "No-Fault" in Illinois, 59
ILL. B.J. 972 (1971); Ryan, Massachusetts Tries No-Fault, 57 A.B.A.J. 431 (1971);
Bar Services Include "No-Fault," Legal Services Shift, 57 A.B.A.J. 762-64 (1971).
But see Clark, The No-Fair No-Fault Proposal, 10(3) CALIF. TRIAL LAWYERS AsS'N
J. 26 (1971); Beloud, California Auto Accident Commission Rejects "No-Fault,"
10(3) CAL. TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N J. 32 (1971). The Keeton-O'Connell and other
no-fault insurance systems have provoked intense controversy, especially in the insur-
ance trade journals. See First Party Tort Liability Offers "Sounder" System in Auto
Reparations, INS. ADVOCATE, May 23, 1970, at 11; Hart Offers Some Advance Views
on Legislation to Solve Auto Insurance Crisis, INS. ADVOCATE, May 16, 1970, at 3;
A New Auto Insurance System, J. INS. INFORMATION, Jan.-Feb. '69, at 2; National
Press Eyes New York No-Fault Plan, NAT. UNDERWRITER, March 6, 1970, at 1;
Hearings Examine "No-Fault" Auto Reparations Plan Proponents: "Cuts, Premiums";
Critics: "Un-American," INS. ADVOCATE, May 9, 1970, at 3; "Startling and Shock-
ing" Picture of Auto Accident System Revealed: Dot 2 Volume Study Released,
INS. ADVOCATE, May 9, 1970, at 5; Jones Sees Dot Public Opinion Survey on "No
Fault" Supporting Acceptance of Concept, INS. ADVOCATE, April 18, 1970, at 8;
Stewart, "No Fault" Proposal Attacked at Hearing, Feeling Mixed on Need for
Revolutionary Change, INS. ADVOCATE, Mar. 14, 1970, at 5; A1A No-Fault Compared
with N.Y. Dept. Proposal, INS. ADVOCATE, Mar. 7, 1970, at 5; Legislators Hear Pro
& Cons of N.Y. Auto Plan, NAT. UNDERWRITER, Mar. 20, 1970, at 1; National Press
Eyes No-Fault Plan, NAT. UNDERWRITER, Mar. 6, 1970, at 1; Fault Backers Glum
over Dot Findings? There May Be Cause, NAT. UNDERWRITER, May 8, 1970, at 1;
Main Dot Study; The Auto System Is Not Working, NAT. UNDERWRITER, May 1,
1970, at 1; Traveler's Head Pushes Modified "Fault" Auto Plan, NAT. UNDERWRITER,
April 17, 1970, at 1; N.Y. No-Fault Plan Gets Cautious Press Approval, NAT.
UNDERWRITER, Feb. 27, 1970, at 1; No-Fault Auto Program for N.Y. Urged by Gov.,
Insurance Dept., NAT. UNDERWRITER, Feb. 20, 1970, at 1.
6. "[D]ivorce, which is now as a practical matter consensual, should become
so as a matter of law." Supra note 3, at 113. See Silving, Divorce Without Fault,
29 IOWA L. REV. 727 (1944); Crummit, Divorce-Equal Fault-Granted to Both
Parties, 25 KAN. ST. BAR J. 209 (1956).
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the most to lose monetarily if it were to be adopted.7  The Church and
others with the more traditional notions of marriage and divorce have
attacked the no-fault divorce with a vigor equal to that of the personal
injury attorney assailing no-fault insurance.
Although divorce litigation is by no means a small burden for the
courts," the reasons generally advanced in favor of no-fault divorce are
often more related to achieving justice between the parties than they are
to alleviating problems in judicial administration. 9 However, the situa-
tion regarding automobile cases is entirely different. At present, this area
of the law composes approximately three-fourths of all major contested
civil cases, and a third to one-half of all cases tried.10 Clearly, if this
area were excised, in whole or in part, from court calendars, the improve-
ment in the efficiency of the system would be phenomenal. Other areas
of the law, including the Uniform Commercial Code, contracts, conflict
of laws, taxation, mortgage foreclosures, probate matters, repossession
problems, and fiduciary duties have also been marked for excision from
7. Non-fault Meets First Challenge, 7(I) TRIAL 8 (1971); Opposition to
Non-Fault Rises, 7(1) TRIAL 48-49 (1971).
8. See Monroe, Mental Cruelty: The Judge in Search of a Precept, 19 DE
PAUL L. REV. 52, 55 (1970). Judge Monroe states that: "[the] national average [is]
1 divorce for every 2.5 marriages; last year in Cook County, 43 divorce decrees
for every 100 marriage licenses; and in Phoenix, 100 divorce decrees for every
100 marriage licenses." Id. at 55 n.9.
9. See BLAKE, THE RoAD TO RENO 237 (1962): "In most unhappy marriages,
husband and wife have both fallen short of perfection. Reconciliation can be
achieved only if both recognize their faults and make a cooperative effort to repair
the union. If such a reconciliation cannot be achieved, a rational divorce pro-
cedure would dissolve the union without attempting to brand one party innocent and
the other guilty. Equally troublesome is the doctrine of 'condonation.' If the
'innocent' party continues to live-or sleep-with the 'guilty' party after he becomes
aware of the latter's wrong behavior, this bars divorce. A more ingenious way of
discouraging reconciliation could scarcely be devised. If a marriage counselor per-
suades a separated couple that they should try living together again, they may
find it difficult to establish grounds for divorce in case the reconciliation fails.
Similarly unrealistic is the doctrine that divorce must be refused if there is evidence
of 'collusion' between the parties. This principle hampers realistic marriage coun-
seling by preserving the fiction that parties contemplating divorce can safely deal
with each other only at arms' length."
10. Supra note 3, at 71-72. Accidents in the United States run some thirteen
million a year; deaths over 50,000; disabling injuries close to two million; medical
expenses $600,000,000; wage losses $2,600,000; property losses $3,300,000,000.
Insurance premiums went from $2,600,000,000 in 1950, to $9,200,000,000 in 1966.
Litigation figures are tricky, but they indicate that some seventy percent of those
persons injured retain legal counsel and thirty-five percent sue. While only three or
four percent go to trial, these trials constitute sixty-five to eighty percent of all civil
court cases; while many are settled, those tried are about one-third to one-half of
all contested civil cases.
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court decision for possible administrative handling. An alternative pro-
cedure would entail merely a decrease in the number of "decision points.""
Removing problem areas of the law from the courts may merely be
ignoring the problem, not solving it. Opponents of complete removal of
problem areas base their objections upon two major arguments: (1) The
courts were originally designed to promote justice between the parties;
and to the extent that they do not do so, reform is needed, but reform
should be within the realm of the court, not outside of it; and (2) what
assurance does the excision solution give that the problems created by it
will not be greater than those it attempts to solve? The alternative pro-
posed by this school of thought is that judicial reform must come about
by improvement in court procedures.' 2  Judge Monroe of the Third Ju-
dicial Circuit of Illinois asks:
Why do scientists and historians in pursuit of truth help each other, and trust
each other's sources, while lawyers fight and dispute, trusting only an eye witness?
In other words, are the adversary system and the hearsay rule really all they seem
to be?
Why aren't exhibits made ready in advance and pre-marked?
Why must a lawyer waste half a day attending a docket call when his case will
get thirty seconds attention-all that is needed to tell him what later day it might
be heard?
Why hold a hearing on an estate account which everybody concerned has seen
and nobody concerned disputes?
Why hear witnesses only one at a time? If three people saw the accident why not
swear them in together and hear their testimony as a group, as is precisely the way the
investigating officer originally heard it? 1'
In the criminal law area, Judge Monroe also advances various proposals
for improvement. He suggests:
Pre-trial conferences could limit issues, rule on motions, determine evidence ques-
tions involving confessions or search and seizure, prepare instructions, or ar-
range scheduling at the very least; bills of particulars, interrogatories, and discovery,
already used in many states by defendants, should be broadened in scope and made
available to the state; when the state's good faith is questioned, its files should be
examined; reasonable plea bargaining with both sides fully on the record (without
binding the court or precommitting any side to undisclosed facts) should be allowed
and encouraged; juries should be picked in hours, not days; misdemeanors should
be left to minor disposition, (and what is a minor or major violation should be de-
termined as early as possible); uniform criminal jury instructions should be used,
as in civil cases; an after-hours court should be maintained for immediate availa-
bility of warrants to arrest or search, for immediate setting of bail, for immediate ad-
11. Supra note 3, at 3.
12. Monroe, The Urgent Case for American Law Reform: A ludge's Response
to a Lawyer's Plea, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 466 (1970).
13. Id. at 473.
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vice regarding counsel, for court record warnings regarding rights of the defendant,
or other miscellaneous uses; the insanity defense should be abolished, and become
relevant not to guilt or innocence, but to questions of sentence or treatment; alter-
natively, the question of guilt or innocence should be tried first, and then the ques-
tion of sanity would be considered, with or without jury, at the defendant's option.14
As it has been pointed out, possible techniques of judicial reform may
include both excision of troublesome legal areas and a modification of
the current procedure to accommodate both present and future cases with
the greatest possible efficiency. However, both modes of departure suf-
fer the same fundamental deficiency-they fail to utilize, or utilize only
indirectly, the benefits of modern technology. One commentator has ad-
vocated the utilization of certain technological improvements, such as ma-
chines for centralized bookkeeping, computers for rapid data retrieval in
scheduling cases, and the elimination of lawyer conflict, and, hence, un-
necessary continuances. 15 Many state courts, however, have been slow to
adopt these suggestions, preferring instead to continue to use the out-
dated system of hand-written dockets. Often the political pressure to re-
tain the traditional system is maintained due to considerations of patron-
age. Only the federal courts have not been lax in adopting these elec-
tronic advancements.' 6 One technological innovation which has received
significant acceptance by no court has been videotape-a medium with
unique features which give it the requisite flexibility to serve a myriad of
purposes in and in relation to courtroom proceedings.' 7
HISTORY AND PRIOR NON-LEGAL USES OF VIDEOTAPE
Invented by the Ampex Corporation' s of Redwood City, California,
in 1956, videotape has received widespread acceptance in all sectors of
the business community. Its original use was to make a permanent rec-
ord of commercial television programs. Later its potential for "instant
replay" began to be utilized on network sports presentations, adding a
new dimension to the age-old game of second-guessing the umpire. Since
14. Supra note 12, at 475-76.
15. Supra note 3, at 172.
16. A comparison of the system utilized by the Criminal Courts, 26th and
California, Chicago, Illinois, and that of the federal courts, Federal Court Building,
Chicago, Illinois, will place the need for technology in the former in stark relief.
17. Compare Fasan, Dean Pedrick, Legal Specialization and Liberal Education,
19 DE PAUL L. REv. 709 (1970) with Pedrick, Collapsible Specialists, 55 A.B.A.J.
324 (1969) (reprinted in 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 699 [1970]).
18. See How Firm Polishes Profit Image, Chicago Daily News, May 5, 1971,
at 53, col. 2 for a discussion of Ampex's tax handling of their sizeable research
and development costs.
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1963, much smaller portable models for closed circuit use have made the
technology available to industry, education, and government. 19 Although
there are variations in the placement of the tape reel in relation to the
recording surface, i.e., transverse versus helical recording, 20 the funda-
mental equipment used is the same: a camera, which converts light en-
ergy into electric signals; a microphone for converting sound waves into
electric impulses; magnetic tape, which serves as a storage bank for both
audio and visual electric impulses; and a monitor, which is used to view the
recording as it is occurring One significant feature of videotape is its
superiority to high quality color film, and its much lower cost. Sony21 has
plans to retail, in early 1972, a system for home "movie" making. The
camera will sell for $200.00, the color video recorder for $500.00, and the
color monitor for $200.00-$500.00.22 Ampex Instavision, probably
19. See Lessig, Stand By for the Cartridge T.V. Explosion, 83(6) FORTUNE (1971).
See also NEWSWEEK 42, August 10, 1970, for a description of videotape uses in the
"how-to-do-it" field and for sporting events. NAT. Bus., September, 1970, at 17
reveals a unique use for videotape. An employer can now interview prospective
employees by videotape. This procedure developed by Ability Search, Inc. saves the
expense of travel and the unpleasantness of a face-to-face rejection. Also see T.V.
Patrol, TIME, May 10, 1971; Mark, Tomorrow's Magic Lantern: A. T.V. Studio in
Your Home, Panarama, Chicago Daily News, June 5-6, 1971 at 23.
Since the advent of videotape, new trade journals have been published. AUDIO-
VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS is almost exclusively devoted to videotape articles and
advertising. See 4(2) AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS 34 (1970); 3(4) AuDio-VIs-
UAL COMMUNICATIONS 16 (1969); 4(1) AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS 18 (1970);
4(3) AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS 25 (1970).
20. Morrill, Enter-The Video Tape Trial, 3 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. AND
PROC. 236 (1970). "Transverse recording, which was developed in 1956 by the
Ampex Corporation, is presently the standard used in the broadcasting industry.
This system, [in which] a two inch wide video tape is moved past recording heads at
15 or 7/2 inches, was introduced at the National Association of Broadcasters Con-
vention in Chicago. This transverse system has since been developed and is now a
sophisticated technique. . . . In 1963, smaller recorders for closed circuit use were
introduced. These recorders use a helical recording technique. The helical re-
cording technique takes its name from the following method of operation: one or
two records-playback heads are mounted on a moving drum and record across the
moving tape in a diagonal curve known as a helix. There are full helical and half
helical systems, the helical system using a single transducer of a drum around
which tape is wrapped on a scanning assembly. Audio and control tracks occupy
narrow spaces near the edge of the videotape. The drawback is that the head
must have the tape for a short instant during which no signal will be available.
The half-helical utilizes two head transducers on the drum to scan the videotape
signal with sufficient overlap so that the electronic switching will permit sequencing
the signal from the tape into continuous form with switching time only transient
from one head to the next." Id. at 251 n.19.
21. As an illustration of the widespread use of video equipment, an advertise-
ment to sell a used videotape system appeared in a recent edition of the Chicago
Daily News.
22. See Multimedia, SATURDAY REVIEW 51, February 27, 1971, for a complete
description of currently available videotape equipment.
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the best of the portable systems, will sell for $1400.00, and color tape
will be priced at $26.00 per one-hour color reel. 23  Thus, the cost of a
three-camera system, which would view simultaneously the judge, the
attorney presenting his case, and the witness, would be approximately
$4,500.00.24 The cost of the tape, which can be reused as many as 25
times, per four-hour session, would be approximately $100.00.
The purpose of this paper is to examine possible uses of videotape in
the following areas: a.) disruption of courtroom proceedings by the un-
ruly defendant; b.) preserving the record; c.) taking depositions; d.) re-
cording the entire trial to be later played to the jury; and e.) police in-
vestigation and the gathering of evidence.
DISRUPTION OF COURTROOM PROCEEDINGS
The Chicago Seven conspiracy trial25 occupied headlines for four and
one-half months. Since this well-publicized trial, there have been dis-
ruptions of court proceedings throughout the nation-in New York, Con-
necticut, and California, among others. Often these trials have been of
a so-called "political" nature, involving such areas as freedom of associa-
tion, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. The defendants in
these trials have often disrupted the orderly proceedings of the court in
an attempt either to prevent its functioning or to gain political support
through the extensive press coverage afforded these trials. Mr. Justice
Black, dissenting in Cox v. Louisiana,2 6 made these comments about the
cause and effect of such tactics in 1965:
The very purpose of a court system is to adjudicate controversies, both criminal and
civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures.
Justice cannot be rightly administered, nor are the lives and safety of prisoners se-
cure, where throngs of people clamor against the processes of justice right outside the
courthouse or jail house doors. The streets are not now and never have been the
proper place to administer justice. Use of the streets for such purposes has always
proved disastrous to individual liberty in the long run, whatever fleeting benefits
may have appeared to have been achieved. And minority groups, I venture to sug-
gest, are the ones who always have suffered and always will suffer most when street
23. See Multimedia, SATURDAY REVIEW 66-67, March 27, 1971; Multimedia,
SATURDAY REVIEW 42, January 30, 1971.
24. See Havemann, Invents Videotape Device to "Guarantee" Testimony, Chi-
cago Sun-Times, May 6, 1971 at 40, col. 1.
25. United States v. Dellinger, No. 18253 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1971). For a de-
tailed discussion of courtroom disruption caused by the conduct of the trial judge,
the defendant, the attorneys, or the spectators see AMERICAN BAR Ass'N PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE JuDoE's ROLE IN DEALING WITH TRIAL
DISRUPTIONS (1971).
26. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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multitudes are allowed to substitute their pressures for the less glamorous but more
dependable and temperate processes of the law. 2 7
The history of courtroom disruption, however, does not begin with the
Cox case or even with the "Chicago Seven" trial, but probably with the
trial of the Nazi Seditionists before Judge Edward C. Eicher in 1944.28
After seven months of continued harassment and personal attack, Judge
Eicher, a thoroughly exhausted and depressed jurist, expired. A well-
planned and well-executed pattern of disruption had succeeded. The de-
fendants in that trial were not later retried.
The next disruption case of major significance was United States v.
Foster.2 9 Eugene Dennis and ten other members of the Communist
Party were placed on trial before Judge Harold Medina. The tactics
employed by the defendants and their attorneys were carbon copies of
those which had succeeded only too well in the Nazi Seditionists case in
1944. This time, however, these efforts did not meet with success. Judge
Medina, a man of strong constitution and great patience, weathered the
storm, and later sentenced his tormentors for contempt.a0
Thus, the stage was set for the Chicago Seven conspiracy trial. Will-
iam Kunstler, defense counsel, who was later sentenced for contempt,
defended his somewhat unorthodox conduct during the trial in a subse-
quent interview:
All of the outbursts in the courtroom and all of the protests made by both the law-
yers and the clients were provoked by the court. I think it's impossible to divorce
the lawyer or the defendant from the human being: and when there are ultimate out-
rages committed in the courtroom by the judge, he must anticipate a human reaction,
and that's exactly what happened in Chicago. These were human reactions by ten
people-two of them lawyers, eight of them defendants-when provoked by a court
that lacked all sensibility, all sense of fair play and due process. 3'
Mr. Kunstler thus focuses on a personality and general life-style clash
with Judge Hoffman as the cause of most of the defendants' outbursts.
But even if Mr. Kunstler's charges of bias are true, will the written re-
cord accurately indicate the non-verbal subtleties which would provoke
the ordinary, reasonable man? How could videotape be used to remedy
the situation?
27. Id. at 583.
28. United States v. McWilliams, 54 F. Supp. 791 (D.D.C. 1944).
29. 81 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), a!f'd in Dennis v. United States, 183
F.2d 201, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
30. In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 269, 87 A.2d 903 (1952), aff'd 345 U.S. 927 (1952).
31. Playboy Interview: William Kuntsler, 17(10) PLAYBOY 71, 74-76 (1970).
See Koskoff, Quest for a Fair Trial, 7(1) TRIAL 22, at 23 (1971).
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Bobby Seale, one of the Chicago Seven, had been bound and gagged
during the course of the trial to prevent his continuous outbursts over
failure of the court to permit him to appear pro se. At the time, this
solution to the unruly problem was not entirely free from constitutional
attack. Fortunately, a similar situation was dealt with in Illinois v. Al-
len,3 2 which held, in reversing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, that
a trial judge acted "completely within his discretion" when he removed
an unruly defendant from his own trial during the presentation of the
prosecution's case.3 3  The Court suggested three alternate means of re-
straining or preventing disruptive conduct; the judge could: (1) bind and
gag the defendant, keeping him physically present within the courtroom;
(2) remove him from the courtroom until he promised to behave in a
more proper fashion; and (3) cite him for contempt.3 4  There is, how-
ever, a more suitable alternative, which guarantees the constructive pres-
ence of the defendant in a manner which is not prejudicial to him, but
which will prevent the disruptive effects of the defendant's actual pres-
ence-videotape recording of the trial, with instant replay in an adjoin-
ing room.
Videotape has all the advantages of defendant's presence, with virtu-
32. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). For a discussion of the right to appear pro se, see
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948). Also see United States v. Bentvena,
319 F.2d 916, 937 (2nd Cir. 1963); Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258
(8th Cir. 1963).
33. 397 U.S. at 347. "No conditions may be imposed on the absolute right of a
criminal defendant to be present at all stages of the proceedings. The insistence
of a defendant that he exercise this right under unreasonable conditions does not
amount to a waiver. Such conditions if insisted upon should and must be dealt
with in a manner that does not compel the relinquishment of his right."
34. Inherent power to punish for contempt has long been recognized. Ex parte
Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). See
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Allen v. Illinois, supra note 32. See also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455(1971); United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970). Contra, 84
HARV. L. REV. 95 (1970) in which it is stated: "Contempt will not effectively deter
the defendant who faces the likelihood of severe punishment for the substantive
criminal offense, or who is motivated by deeply held political philosophical views to
mock a judicial system which he mistrusts. Similarly, a defendant may seek nothing
but notoriety or martyrdom, or may be convinced that the judge is 'railroading'
him, and thus will not be influenced by the threat of contempt.
"Contempt permits lengthy incarceration of the defendant without the most ele-
mental due process rights, including indictment, hearing, proof, and trial by jury,
substituting for these the summary judgment of a judge who is often emotionally
involved.
"Criminal contempt-unlike recess or removal-rises above a primarily corrective
measure used to remedy disorder and becomes power to punish, whose use might
turn not only on defendant's courtroom behavior but also on his motives for dis-
ruption." Accord: See Pitts, Courtroom Conduct and the Preservation of Freedom,
[Vol. XX
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ally no drawbacks, psychologically or constitutionally. Witnesses will re-
alize that they are being watched. s5 The defendant can communicate with
his counsel by telephone, so that he would be able to assist in his own
defense. a6 The defendant would not be forced to appear bound and gagged
before the jury which would tend to prejudice the jury psychologi-
cally against him. 37 Also, his contact with counsel would insure his right
to confront and cross examine his accusers.38  This solution to the prob-
lem would be effective, to a certain extent, even in cases where the judge
is in part responsible for the defendant's behavior, since there would be
no possibility of contact between the parties.3 9 Instant replay in another
room would not, of course, remove defense counsel from conflict with
the judge.
THE ILLINOIS EXPERIMENT: "FAIR TRIAL" V. "FREE PRESS"
In September and October, 1968, the Administrative Office of the Ill-
inois Courts installed videotape on a trial basis in several suburban Chi-
cago courtrooms, using a system known as Trialvision. 40  This experi-
mentation represents the first attempt to utilize videotape in courtrooms
as a substitute for or a supplement to stenographic court reporting, 41 al-
though sound tape has been proposed and used in some jurisdictions for
this purpose for many years. 42 Although many of the objections to the
use of sound recording to preserve the record do not apply to videotape
(due to its added dimension of visual recording) other objections have
been expressed, which are probably a result of a confusion of videotape,
59 ILL. B.J. 648 (1971). See generally Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented,
Misrepresented, and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 DUQUESNE L. REv.
245 (1964).
35. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
36. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
37. Way v. United States, 285 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1960) which stated that
under the common law, a defendant who was bound and gagged during his trial
cannot possibly be said to have received a fair trial.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. Supra note 31.
40. MADDEN, INTERIM REPORT To THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS-ExPERI-
MENTAL VIDEO-TAPING OF COURTROOM PROCEEDINGS (1968). A copy can be ob-
tained by writing to Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, Room 2010, 30
North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, 60602.
41. See Sullivan, Court Record by Videotape-Tape Experiment-A Success, 50
CHI. B. REC. 336 (1969).
42. See Rodebaugh, Sound Recording in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal, 47
A.B.A.J. 1185 (1961). See also STATE OF ALASKA, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM MANUAL
OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING (1960).
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to be used internally within the court, with motion pictures, photography,
and television, which are primarily for the purpose of broadcast to the
public. 43
The cases of Sheppard v. Maxwell 44 and Estes v. Texas45 do not en-
courage the use of cameras in the courtroom. In order to examine the
reason behind this general hesitancy, it is necessary to examine the evolu-
tion of judicial policy considerations in this area. Canon 35 of the Can-
ons of Judicial Ethics, adopted in Illinois and the federal courts, reads
as follows:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The
taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calcu-
lated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in
giving his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconceptions with respect
thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted. 46
Provided that this restriction shall not apply to the broadcasting or televising, un-
der the supervision of the court, of such portions of naturalization proceedings
(other than the interrogation of applicants) as are designed and carried out exclu-
sively as a ceremony for the purpose of publicly demonstrating in an impressive
manner the essential dignity and the serious nature of naturalization.4 7
It was adopted in response to the 1935 case of State v. Hauptmann,48
when over 700 newspapermen and 129 cameramen were assigned to cover
the trial, in a courtroom designed to accommodate 260 persons! Some
of the numerous abuses included scare headlines; purported confessions;
polls of public opinion as to guilt or innocence; moving picture and re-
cording equipment smuggled into the courtroom; and even gifts of sub-
43. See 44 F.R.D. 391, 417 (1968) for a discussion of the dilemma of free
press v. free trial; Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1404 (1966). See also Annots., Published
article or broadcast as direct contempt of court: 69 A.L.R.2d 676 (1930); Exclu-
sion of public during criminal trial: 156 A.L.R. 265 (1945); 48 A.L.R.2d 1436
(1956); Legal aspects of television: 15 A.L.R.2d 785 (1951); Rights of privacy:
138 A.L.R. 22 (1942); 168 A.L.R. 446 (1947); 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1951); Legal
aspects of radio communication and broadcasting: 40 A.L.R. 1515 (1926); 66
A.L.R. 1361 (1930); 82 A.L.R. 1106 (1933); 89 A.L.R. 420 (1934); 104 A.L.R. 872(1936); 124 A.L.R. 982 (1940); 171 A.L.R. 765 (1947). For a discussion of coun-
sel's control over the taking of photographs and radio or television broadcasting in
or near the courtroom, see 1 AM. JUR. Trials § 303; Controlling Trial Publicity § 36.
44. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
45. 381 U.S. 532 (1966).
46. REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 168-69 (1964). For a concise
history of the development of Canon 35, see supra note 45, at 596-601.
47. Colorado and Texas leave the question to the discretion of the trial judge
with the exception that a witness may not be compelled to testify if he is to be
photographed. See 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956); 88 A.B.A. Rep. 314
(1963).
48. 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
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poenas to those who feared that otherwise they would not be able to at-
tend.49  The reason for the adoption of Canon 35 was clear-to give
the defendant a fair trial free from prejudicial publicity.50 Cameras had
been shown to be likely to distract attention, to upset already nervous
witnesses; to increase tensions both inside and outside the courtroom, and
generally to turn the entire proceeding into a circus. 51 Those who oppose
Canon 35-inspired rules of court procedure generally do so on one or
more of four basic grounds: (1) the free speech argument; 52 (2) the free
press argument; (3) the public trial argument; and (4) the equality of ac-
cess argument. 53 These theories of opposition to Canon 35 need not be
resorted to in order to use internal videotape, for, in each of the prior
cases, the picture or moving pictures were for dissemination to the pub-
lic. 5 4
Not all jurisdictions have adopted or utilized Canon 35. Colorado,
for example, has not made exclusion of cameras a mandatory provision,
but rather has left it to the discretion of the trial judge as to whether pub-
licity would prove to be prejudicial to the defendant. 55  Colorado has
good results without Canon 35 in that there has been little of the abuse
49. Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN.
L. REV. 453, 454 (1940).
50. McCoy, The Judge and Courtroom Publicity, 37 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 167-81
(1954).
51. See, e.g., as favoring retention and observance of Canon 35 in its present
form: Televising Court Proceedings, A Plea for Order in the Court, 36 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 147 (1960); Televising and Broadcasting Trials, 37 CORNELL L.Q.
701 (1951); Television and Newsreel Coverage of a Trial, 43 IOWA L. REV. 616
(1957); The Standards of the Legal Profession: Canon 35 Should Not Be Sur-
rendered, 48 A.B.A.J. 615 (1962); Judicial Canon 35 Should Not Be Changed, 48
A.B.A.J. 540 (1962); A Country Lawyer Looks at Canon 35, 47 A.B.A.J. 761
(1961); The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840 (1960) (lecture
delivered under the auspices of the Law School of the University of Colorado,
May 10, 1960, by William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States). As favoring modification or elimination of Canon 35, see the
following: The New Star Chamber-TV in the Courtroom, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 281
(1958); The Case of the Controversial Canon, 48 A.B.A.J. 429 (1962); Courts,
Communications and Canon 35, 46 A.B.A.J. 1295 (1960); Should Canon 35 Be
Amended? A Question of Fair Trial and Free Information, 42 A.B.A.J. 334 (1956).
For a general discussion see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1968).
52. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1949).
53. See United Press Assoc. v. Valente, 281 App. Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S.2d 179
(1953). Accord: Ohio v. Clifford, 118 N.E.2d 853 (1954), aff'd 123 N.E.2d 8
(1954), cert. denied 349 U.S. 929 (1955).
54. See 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1955). Contra: Television Court Pro-
ceedings A Plea for Order in the Court, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 147 (1961).
55. See Hall, Colorado's Six Years' Experience Without Judicial Canon 35, 48
A.B.A.J. 1120 (1962).
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which originally caused the rule to be promulgated. 6a Colorado's expe-
rience with cameras in the courtroom would be further evidence that in-
obtrusively placed videotape cameras would not cause a "circus atmos-
phere."
Although the history of Canon 35, the policies behind it, and the cir-
cumstances surrounding its adoption are not accurately recorded within
its text, it would seem logical that the original prohibition was intended
to extend only as far as the facts and circumstances it was designed to
control. However, in 1953, Illinois adopted a statute in response to the
negative publicity surrounding the McCarthy Senate investigations:
No witness shall be compelled to testify in any proceeding conducted by a court
. . . if any portion of his testimony is to be broadcast or televised or if motion pic-
tures are to be taken of him while he is testifying.67
The wording encompasses an absolute prohibition. In the absence of a
showing of contrary legislative intent, it would appear to foreclose judi-
cial interpretation softening its terms. This statute should be amended
to exclude from its prohibitions videotape for internal use, adding "ex-
cept where videotape recording under the control of the court supple-
ments or supplants stenographic notes of proceedings."58
When this statute has been amended, there will be no specific statu-
tory pronouncements as to the use of videotape. Two questions, how-
ever, remain: (1) whether the internal use of videotape for the record-
ing of courtroom proceedings violates fundamental rights of the accused
deemed so basic as to amount to a denial of due process; and (2) whether
the videotape system is sufficiently effective to merit continued testing
and use?
Professor Bassiouni has conceptualized the standards to be applied in
order to determine whether a procedure violates due process as follows:
The Constitution undertakes to safeguard "immutable principles of justice" by ap-
plying standards acceptable to a civilized society. It is a set of minimum standards
which are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Inherent in this
scheme are canons of decency founded on principles of natural law and funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice, all of which are indispensable to secure
life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness in a free society. These mini-
mal standards of justice, which society has a right to expect from those entrusted
with sovereign prerogatives and the power of collective law enforcement, are at the
base of all civil and political structures designed to preserve freedom and democracy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Rochin v. California, noted the absence of any "formal
56. Contra: Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MT. L.
REV. 1 (1960).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 51, § 57 (Smith-Hurd 1967).
58. Supra note 40, at 21.
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exactitude and fixity of meaning in the due process clause because words symbols
do not speak without a gloss. The gloss of some of the verbal symbols of the Con-
stitution does not give them a fixed technical context, but it exacts a continuing
process of application." In the Rochin case, the facts revealed that officers had
pumped the stomach of the defendant after they witnessed him swallowing narco-
tics. The officers who had forcefully entered into the defendant's room on the
strength of a search warrant were considered to have acted unreasonable and in a
manner shocking to the conscience of the people and thus reprehensible. Never-
theless, in other cases, the Court held that the involuntary taking of blood from a per-
son to perform a blood analysis was not shocking to the conscience of the people
and was not unreasonable. This leads to a question: What is the process by which
judges can determine the difference and distinction between pumping the stomach
and drawing blood? The standards of a society at a given time will constitute the
basis of what is acceptable and what is not. As stated by Munroe Smith:
In their effort to give to the social sense of justice articulate expression in rules
and in principles, the methods of lawfinding experts has always been experi-
mental and the rules and principles of case laws have never been treated as fi-
nal proofs, but as working hypotheses continually retested in those grave lab-
oratories of the law-courts of justice. Every new case is an experiment; the
accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result, which, if felt to be unjust,
the rule is reconsidered. It may not be modified at once, for the attempt to do
absolute justice in every single case would make the development of general
rules impossible; but if a rule continues to work injustice it will eventually be
reformulated. The principles themselves are continually retested; for if the rules
derived from a principle do not work well, the rules themselves must ultimately
be reexamined.5 9
The right to a fair trial includes the right to an impartial jury, unbiased
and uninfluenced in its determination. In the case of Turner v. Louisi-
ana,60 the Court indicated that the evidence presented at the trial must
be the sole basis for its verdict. Furthermore, this evidence shall come
from duly sworn witnesses where defendants' rights to confrontation, cross
examination and right to counsel are not abridged. 61 It does not appear
that the use of videotape would abridge any of these rights of the defen-
dant.
In order to determine the propriety of videotape's future use in the
promotion of justice, its possible disruptive effects, both physically and
psychologically, must be examined. The size, noise, and physical layout
of the system will determine its disruptive effect. If the parties must vary
their conduct in any way from their normal patterns, a disruption, albeit
a small inconvenience, may occur. The Trialvision system utilized in the
59. BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESS: THE LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER
319-20 (1969).
60. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
61. See supra note 59, at 491-503.
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Illinois experiment, however, was small, inconspicuous, and silent.62  No
special lighting was necessary.
Psychological disruption may occur, however, in the absence of any
physical disruption. " It was just this factor which constituted a viola-
tion of due process in the Estes case because of the inherent psychologi-
cal effects of television cameras on the judge, the jury, witnesses and the
defendant. 64 However, the holding in Estes is confined to an audio-visual
dissemination to the public; no such psychological effects could be said
to stem from a mere internal use of videotape, particularly the type of
system used experimentally in the Illinois experiment. One might ask,
however, whether the presence of a camera would cause the participants
to engage in actions prejudicial to the defendant? The Illinois experi-
ment found no evidence of counsel "playing to the camera." In fact,
after the judge had revealed the presence of the camera and explained
its function, it was treated in a very routine fashion. 5 The "circus atmos-
phere" 66 originally feared in videotape recording situations simply did
not exist. If anything, the presence of a permanent record would tend
to improve the performance of the parties, as they would be aware that
their actions may later be viewed by the appellate courts. A danger which
should be closely guarded against exists here. If appellate courts are view-
ing the trial as it actually occurred by means of videotape, there will be a
pronounced tendency, perhaps due to nothing other than human nature,
to substitute their view of the facts for that of the trial court, which would
constitute a trial de novo on appeal. This result would clearly be outside
the traditional scope of appellate review. One thing is certain, however,
there would be no doubt as to what facts were actually found.
THE "DEMEANOR" PROBLEM
A Texas court found that the trial judge had "indulged in facial ex-
pressions in the nature of frowns or scowls, and shook his head from
side to side in a negative manner. ' '67 A Montana appellate court noted
62. See supra note 41, at 337; and Madden, Illinois Pioneers Videotaping of
Trials, 55 A.B.A.J. 457-60 (1969). See generally, MADDEN, supra note 40.
63. Supra note 45, at 541.
64. Interestingly enough, the Court uses videotapes of the trial proceeding as
evidence to show the lack of "judicial serenity and calm ...... Supra note 45, at
536.
65. Supra note 41, at 337-38.
66. Supra note 41, at 338-39.
67. See People v. Fort, 14 Ill. 2d 491, 153 N.E.2d 120 (1961). But see
People v. Butler, 78 Ill. App. 2d 479, 223 N.E.2d 431 (1967).
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that the trial judge "shook his finger at counsel for defendant, tapped
his desk with a pencil, and talked in a loud and angry manner."68 In
both cases, the appellate courts, however, could not reverse the convic-
tions on the basis of conduct prejudicial to the defendant because of the
inherent inability of the medium-a stenographic transcript-to reflect ac-
curately the subtle mannerisms, facial expressions, or tone of voice of the
judge while engaging in the enumerated conduct.
In order for the defendant to receive a fair trial, the judge must not
permit the jury to receive any idea whatsoever as to the trial judge's state
of mind during the trial,6 9 for if the jurors are able to determine how the
court "regard[s] the witness' testimony, or the merits of the case, . . .
[the jury] . . . almost invariably [will] follow them."' 70 Videotape will
in fact discourage the tendency of a judge to show bias during the trial.
Also it will provide a permanent record of counsel's demeanor, should
the question of contempt arise and necessitate appellate review, 71 for it
is well recognized that not only what is said, but how it is said, is impor-
tant in determining whether the dignity of the court has been injured.
Counsel's demeanor in delivering closing arguments often is not accur-
ately reflected in the record. Although an Illinois attorney is not per-
mitted to weep before the jury,72 how close may he come and still pro-
duce the same effect? As for the prosecution's closing argument, only
videotape could reflect the full inflammatory effect of counsel's reference
to the sordid details of an abortion 73 or the equally sordid exhibits there-
of.7 4 The videotape record will do one thing that an ordinary steno-
graphic transcript can never do-it will show (not tell) the appellate court
exactly what happened at the trial level.
PROBLEMS IN UTILIZATION OF VIDEOTAPE
AS A COURT RECORD
Like the audiotape before it, the videotaped trial record is being sub-
68. Compare People v. Murdock, 39 Ill. 2d 553, 237 N.E.2d 442 (1968) with
People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 101, 195 N.E.2d 675 (1964).
69. "It is essential that jury trials shall be managed fairly, and that trial
judges shall not only be just to both sides, but that they shall conduct themselves in
such a manner than an impartial state of mind is apparent to all concerned."
Loncar v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 84 Mont. 841, 274 P. 844 (1929).
70. See People v. Dukes, 12 Ill. 2d 334, 146 N.E.2d 14 (1955). See also
Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 724 (1955).
71. United States v. Dellinger, No. 18253 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1970).
72. See People v. Murdock, 39 Ill. 2d 553, 237 N.E.2d 448 (1968). But see
People v. Tyner, 30 Ill. 2d 101, 195 N.E.2d 675 (1964).
73. People v. Young, 398 Ill. 117, 75 N.E.2d 349 (1947).
74. State v. Boozer, 80 Ariz. 8, 291 P.2d 786 (1955).
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jected to certain traditional criticisms. Court reporters complain that the
systems are too expensive. But as seen, the current cost of a three-
camera system would be only about four-thousand dollars, and re-useable
magnetic tape costs only twenty-six dollars per hour reel. Only when it
is known that Alaska, which since 1960 has used sound recording as its
exclusive courtroom recording technique, has saved nearly three million
dollars, do we begin to realize the tremendous cost of stenographic re-
porting. 75 In fact, it is estimated that by not adopting sound recording
when it first became realistic in 1960 the courts have wasted two billion
dollars; 76 two billion dollars would buy a lot of video tape. Court reporters
also emphasize the likelihood of mechanical failure, but fail to note that hu-
man beings also, and with far greater frequency, are in need of rest, re-
covery from illness, or general "repairs." It is also argued, with far less
validity for videotape than for sound tape, that present single-track re-
corders do not differentiate sufficiently between voices to permit the
viewer to know who is talking.77 However, synchronized lip movements
on videotape solves this problem, so that no difficulty will be had, even
in transcribing the video record. 78
But what of the stenotype system? What are its drawbacks? Since
the world's record for stenotype (a phonetic system produced by simul-
taneous strokes on a machine which resembles both a typewriter and an
adding machine) is only 282 words per minute, 79 often the reporter can-
not keep up with the conversation, either because the parties are speak-
ing too fast or because several parties begin speaking at once. Reporters
often must have technical words spelled, and foreign languages are all
but hopeless. What, then, is the real motivation behind this unwarrant-
ed criticism? Perhaps it is the same motivation possessed by the per-
sonal injury attorney who attacks no-fault insurance or the domestic re-
lations attorney who attacks the no-fault divorce-that of economics.
Clearly, if videotape were widely adopted the court reporter would be
obsolete. He would not be necessary even for transcribing, as a typist,
using a rheostat to slow the speed of the tape to the desired rate, could
75. See Electronic Recording (Scourge of Court Reporter), LAWYER REFORM
NEws 1-3 (1971).
76. Id. See also supra note 41, at 339.
77. Rodenbaugh, Sound Recording in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal, 7 A.B.A.J.
1187 (1961). For a comparison of sound recording with stenotype, see Conven-
tional Method Preferred, 57 A.B.A.J. 754 (1971).
78. Id. at 1185.
79. Supra note 75, at 1.
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type directly from the videotape. 0 Judges often have been very little
concerned about the smooth and efficient functioning of the courts, which
could be made possible through modern technology. In many cases, they
have abandoned their position of leadership and authority in the court,
giving court reporters a free hand to frustrate modernization.81 It is sig-
nificant that Alaska did not permit any trial period, which would give
court employees the opportunity to subvert the system and then find "tech-
nical problems requiring further study." The Chief Justice of the Alaska
Supreme Court has simply stated: "All personnel were advised that it
had been officially determined that the equipment and techniques were
adequate if instructions were followed."'8 2  Perhaps the courts of Illinois
would be well advised also to take this type of no-nonsense approach.
The use of videotape must be examined in light of current practice
regarding the record. The question arises as to how the videotape rec-
ord will be certified? Will it automatically become certified, will it be-
come certified only in the discretion of the trial judge, or only upon stip-
ulation by the parties?
For arraignments, 3 trial, 4 or post-conviction hearings, 5 a verbatim
transcription of the proceedings is mandatory in Illinois. It is the re-
sponsibility of the trial court to certify the record for appeal.8 6 The par-
ties may stipulate as to the composition of the record, 7 or, in the absence
of a stipulation, the clerk will fulfill this role,88 although the trial judge
has the ultimate authority as to what may be included. 9 He may in fact
refuse to certify the record in his discretion, ° which would foreclose
80. Contra: see supra note 41, at 340; Morrill, Enter the Video Tape Trial,
3 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 252 (1970).
81. For another example of lack of judicial leadership, see generally Gazell,
Leadership Competition in Judicial Management at the State Level, 19 DE PAUL
L. REV. 737 (1970).
82. Supra note 75, at 3.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, § 163 (f)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1969).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, § 163 (f)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1969).
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, § 163 (f)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1969).
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 110A, § 608 (Smith-Hurd 1969).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 110A, § 323(c) (Smith-Hurd 1969). For a his-
torical development of this procedure, see People v. Lyle, 329 Ill. 418, 422, 160
N.E. 742 (1928); People v. Holdom, 193 Ill. 319, 323, 61 N.E. 1014 (1901);
Weatherford v. Wilson, 3 Ill. 253, 256 (1840).
88. People v. McKee, 25 Ill. 2d 553, 185 N.E.2d 682, cert. denied 374 U.S. 810,
reh. denied 375 U.S. 872 (1962).
89. See People v. Teggelaar, 82 Ill. App. 2d 67, 227 N.E.2d 91 (1967);
People v. Buzinski, 64 Ill. App. 2d 194, 212 N.E.2d 270 (1965).
90. People v. Thomas, 88 Ill. App. 2d 619, 232 N.E.2d 259 (1967).
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appeal; 91 in this case, the appellant's remedy would be a writ of manda-
mus to force him to certify the record.
Because the trial judge has been a participant in the trial and may
have motives to prevent the viewing of the record on appeal, especially
if the trial judge fears that he may have acted improperly, it is not rea-
sonable to permit the trial judge to decide whether to certify the record.
This is especially true for the videotape record, since the judge's actions will
be clearly shown to all who view it. It simply makes no sense to permit
this potential for abuse to exist, especially where a judge's retention and
promotion may be tied to political consideration. Certification of the
complete videotaped proceedings should be mandatory; an enactment of
the state legislature should remedy this situation.
PROBLEMS OF ADMISSION OF VIDEOTAPE
RECORDINGS INTO EVIDENCE
To date, only one case has been reviewed by an appellate court where
the admissibility of videotape played to the jury was at issue. 92 The pre-
cise issue was whether a videotaped confession would be allowed into evi-
dence. The court stated: "The rule governing admissibility into evidence
of photographs applies with equal force to the admission of motion pic-
tures and videotapes." 93  The court then went on to quote a 1937 Cali-
fornia case 4 which dealt with the admissibility of a motion picture:
This particular case well illustrates the advantage to be gained by court's utilizing
modern methods of science in ascertaining facts....
We are satisfied that it should, and that it stands on the same basis as the presenta-
tion in court of a confession through any orthodox mechanical medium, that is,
there is a preliminary question to be determined by the trial judge as to whether or
not the sound moving picture is an accurate reproduction of that which it is al-
leged occurred. If after a preliminary examination, the trial judge is satisfied that
the sound moving picture reproduces accurately that which has been said and done,
and the other requirements relative to the admissibility of a confession are present,
i.e., it was freely and voluntarily made without hope of immunity or promise of re-
ward, then, not only should the preliminary foundation and the sound moving pic-
ture go to the jury, but in keeping with the policy of the courts to avail themselves of
each and every aid of science for the purpose of ascertaining the truth, such prac-
tice is to be commended as an inestimable value to triers of fact in reaching accurate
conclusion.5
91. People v. Cincci, 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1955).
92. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969) See also Note, 16 LOYOLA
L. REV. 194 (1970).
93. Paramore v. State, supra note 92, at 859.
94. People v. Hayes, 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937).
95. Paramore v. State, supra note 92, at 859.
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There is virtual universal accord that, once a proper foundation is laid
for a voice recording, it may be placed in evidence. 96 This foundation
would consist of the following: (1) a showing that the recording device
was capable of taking testimony; (2) a showing that the operator of the
device was competent; (3) establishment of the authenticity and correct-
ness of the recording; (4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions
have not been made; (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of
the recording; (6) identification of the speakers; and (7) a showing that
the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of induce-
ment.97 These factors would insure not only that the videotape recorded
exactly what the camera saw, but that the results would be what they
purport to be, without distortion of perspective or time.
96. See HAUTS, PHOTOGRAPHIC MISREPRESENTATION § 30.02 (1964). See gen-
erally, Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 873 (1957); Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 838 (1951); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C.
Cir. 1950). See Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956). See also
Fikes v. State, 263 Ala. 89, 81 So. 2d 303 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352
U.S. 191 (1955); Wright v. State, 38 Ala. App. 64, 79 So. 2d 66 (1954), cert.
denied, 262 Ala. 420, 79 So. 2d 74 (1954); People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 197
P.2d 1 (1948); People v. Mackenzie, 144 Cal. App. 2d 100, 300 P.2d 700 (1956);
People v. Avas, 144 Cal. App. 2d 91, 300 P.2d 695 (1956); People v. Fratianno,
132 Cal. App. 2d 610, 282 P.2d 1002 (1955); People v. Jackson, 125 Cal. App. 2d
776, 271 P.2d 196 (1954); People v. Eads, 124 Cal. App. 2d 393, 268 P.2d 561
(1954); People v. Sica, 112 Cal. App. 2d 574, 247 P.2d 72 (1952); People v.
Porter, 105 Cal. App. 2d 324, 233 P.2d 102 (1951); Wilms v. Hano, 101 Cal. App.
2d 811, 226 P.2d 728 (1951); People v. Haves, 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71 P.2d 321(1937); State v. Lorain, 141 Conn. 694, 109 A.2d 504 (1954); Kilpatrick v. Kil-
patrick, 123 Conn. 218, 193 A. 765 (1937); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Stossel, 131
Fla. 127, 179 S. 163 (1938); Steve M. Soloman Jr., Inc. v. Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207,
88 So. 2d 167 (1955); State v. Sutton, 273 Ind. 305, 145 N.E.2d 425 (1957);
State v. Triplett, 248 Iowa 339, 79 N.W.2d 391 (1956); State v. Alleman, 218 La.
821, 51 So. 2d 83 (1950); McGuire v. State, 700 Mo. 601, 92 A.2d 582 (1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 928 (1953); State v. Gensmer, 235 Minn. 72, 51 N.W.2d 680(1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Raasch, 201 Minn. 158, 275
N.W. 620 (1937); Ray v. State, 213 Miss. 650, 57 So. 2d 469 (1952); State v.
Perkins, 355 Mo. 851, 198 S.W.2d 704 (1946); State v. Porter, 125 Mont. 503,
242 P.2d 984 (1952); Epstein v. Epstein, 285 App. Div. 1128, 141 N.Y.S.2d (1955);
Frank v. Cossitt Cement Prod., 197 Misc. 670, 97 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1950); People v.
Hornbeck, 277 App. Div. 1136, 101 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1950); People v. Miller, 270
App. Div. 107, 58 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1945); State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 607, 308 P.2d 182(1957); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); Common-
wealth v. Clark, 123 Pa. Super. 277, 187 A. 237 (1936); Kirkendoll v. State, 198
Tenn. 497, 281 S.W.2d 243 (1955); State v. Williams, 49 Wash. 2d 354, 301 P.2d 769
(1956); State v. Lyskowski, 47 Wash. 2d 102, 287 P.2d 114 (1955); State v. Slater,
36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950); State v. Salk, 34 Wash. 2d 183, 708 P.2d
(1949); Paulson v. Scott, 260 Wis. 141, 50 N.W.2d 376 (1951).
97. United States v. McKeever, 169 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Steve M.
Soloman, Jr., Inc. v. Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207, 88 S.E.2d 167 (1955); State v.
Williams, 49 Wash. 2d 354, 301 P.2d 769 (1956); State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551,
374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963).
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In addition to the admission of a videotaped confession into evidence,
other uses of videotape evidence at trial include a videotaped interroga-
tion of defendant while under the influence of sodium pentothal ("truth
serum") in the Kidwell case. s Kidwell's conviction of first-degree mur-
der had been reversed by the Supreme Court of Kansas. His videotaped
interview with his attorney, under supervision of experts, vividly pointed
out the actual circumstances surrounding his wife's death. The charge
was reduced to a lesser offense.99 Several months later a similar use of
videotaped evidence was made by a Santa Clara court. A woman con-
victed of murdering her child participated in a videotaped conference with
a psychiatrist while under hypnosis. The trial judge permitted this tape
to be played to the jury. Although the defendant was convicted, it seems
apparent that the use of videotape made the conviction rest on more
solid footing. 100 Other possibilities for use of videotape evidence en-
compass those areas where insanity or intoxication would vitiate any show-
ing of specific intent by the prosecution, if the videotape were made close
enough in time to the alleged offense. One limitation, however, should
be kept in mind: Photographic evidence must not be overly inflammatory;
it must possess adequate value and, yet, not unfairly prejudice defendant's
case.101
The most significant use of videotape could be in the evidence deposi-
tion. 10 2 Chief Judge Leland Simkins of the 1lth Circuit is experimenting
in his courts with evidence depositions of medical experts in personal in-
jury cases.' 03 This should result in a considerable saving of court time,
for previously, if an expert were unavailable, the trial could not proceed.
The court is asking that opposing counsel stipulate to their use, even
though the deponent's absence does not meet the standards of Supreme
Court Rule 212(6).10°4 It is this latter rule which prevents full utilization
98. See TIME, December 29, 1967, at 38.
99. See TIME, April 12, 1968, at 57.
100. See People v. Wright, 30 Il1. 2d 519, 198 N.E.2d 316 (1964).
101. Cerny, Court Reporting: Facts for Public Officials, 42 A.B.A.J. 437 (1956).
See supra note 73.
102. See Havemann, Invents Videotape Device to "Guarantee" Testimony, Chi-
cago Sun-Times, May 6, 1971, at 40, col. 1.
103. See Eleventh Circuit Plans Use of Videotaped Medical Testimony, 1(1)
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION SECTION NEWSLETTER OF THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR Asso-
CIATION 2 (1970).
104. "(b) Use of Evidence Depositions. All or any part of an evidence
deposition may be used, and may be used by any party for any purpose if the
court finds that at the time of the trial:
(1) the deponent is dead or unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment;
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of the evidence deposition. The authorities are in complete agreement
that evidence depositions or testimony in a prior hearing cannot be used
if the deponent or witness is available for in-person testimony. 1 5 Evi-
dently, the courts at common law placed great value upon the jury's op-
portunity to observe the demeanor of the witness, especially upon cross
examination. In the days before videotape became available, the only
possible method of maximizing the opportunity of juries to observe a wit-
ness' demeanor was to promulgate such a rule. However, today, as the
reasons behind the rule's adoption no longer exist, the rule ought to be
repealed, either under the rule-making power delegated to the courts
by the legislature, or by direct legislative enactment.
IN-COURT:
OTHER USES OF VIDEOTAPE
One commentator, Morrill, has advocated taping the entire trial, not
for purposes of preserving the record for appeal, but primarily for the
purpose of playing it at a later date to a jury.10 This would permit in-
admissible statements to be stricken before they are heard by the jury. 0 7
This would represent a considerable improvement over the present method
of rectifying non-reversible error-merely admonishing the jury to disre-
gard the statement. Clearly, an entirely recorded trial would be a con-
venience to the jurors, who would be able to plan weeks ahead for future
jury duty. It is also pointed out that far fewer errors in judicial rulings
will result, because the judge would have a much longer period in which
to view the problem at hand.' 0 8 Evidence will not be lost 0 9 and the cost
of expert testimony will be significantly reduced. 1 0 Mr. Morrill further
advances the thesis that such a system will permit a more efficient use of
(2) the deponent is out of the county, unless it appears that the absence was
procured by the party offering the deposition, provided, that a party who is not a
resident of this state may introduce his own deposition if he is absent from the
county; or
(3) the party offering the deposition has exercised reasonable diligence but has
been unable to procure the attendance of the deponent by subpoena; or finds, upon
notice and motion in advance of trial, that exceptional circumstances exist which
made it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard for the importance
of presenting testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition
to be used."
105. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1401 at 146 (3rd ed. 1940).
106. See Morrill, supra note 80.
107. Morrill, supra note 80.
108. Morrill, supra note 80, at 241.
109. Morrill, supra note 80, at 242.
110. Morrill, supra note 80, at 243.
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the current bar with increased possibilities for specialization in the fu-
ture."'I It is also pointed out that with his evidence depositions re-
corded on videotape an attorney can then evaluate his case before trial,'1 2
and possibly this perspective would encourage settlement of claims, and,
thus, ultimately reduce the load on the courts. 11
These are only a few of the possible legal uses for videotape. Ulti-
mately, the entire legal process, criminal and civil, will utilize videotape.
For example, in the area of contracts, a videotape recording of prelim-
inary negotiations and the later signing might clarify the meaning of any
ambiguous terms, and thus lessen litigation. In cases where the testator
is of advanced years, and it is feared that the validity of the will may
later be questioned by an attack on the testator's competence, a video-
tape recording of the execution of the will would prove valuable to the
estate in a later will contest.
THE USE OF VIDEOTAPE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Videotape has shown definite promise of useful application in the areas
of criminal investigation and evidence gathering, in addition to its uses
in the courtroom. Since the development of a low-cost, portable video-
tape system in 1966, Ampex has had considerable sale to law enforce-
ment bodies, 1 4 including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Con-
necticut State Police, the Santa Barbara Police Department, and the Chi-
cago Police Department.
Chief Jack Howe of the Santa Barbara Police Department has uncov-
ered a possible problem area in the unfettered use of videotape equip-
111. Morrill, supra note 80, at 236-37.
112. Morrill, supra note 80, at 247.
113. See generally, Monroe, The Urgent Case for American Law Reform: A
Judge's Response to a Lawyer's Plea, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 466 (1970).
114. See HANSEN AND KOLBMANN, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION FOR POLICE
(1970). Captain Hansen and Sergeant Kolbmann of the Daly City, California
Police Department have described the experiences of their police force with video-
tape since its initiation in 1967. The work is a practical manual for police depart-
ments in the use of videotape. Videotape techniques as well as the most current
equipment available are aptly described. The authors effectively point out poten-
tial and actual uses of videotape by police in the areas of: 1.) administration,
intelligence, including crowd control, traffic control, riot control, and high crime
areas; 2.) surveillance in the area of homicide, burglary, and robbery investiga-
tions, as well as in vice control and automobile theft investigations; 3.) training in
police tactics; and 4.) security in the areas of internal and external police premises
and jail complexes. In addition the illustrations make the manual a particularly
effective training tool.
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ment by law enforcement agencies. In drunken driving cases, the sus-
pect's interrogation is videotaped as a supplement to the testimony of the
arresting officer. Chief Howe reports that after later viewing these tapes,
many defendants do not contest the charges and a guilty plea is en-
tered.115  The danger implicit in this use of technology is that a sub-
system of justice will develop, wherein it will be the police and techni-
cians, rather than the courts, who would in effect determine guilt or in-
nocence. Other investigatory uses of videotape include (1) its use in
department stores, airports, railroad stations, factories, and warehouses for
surveillance purposes; (2) its use in squad cars to record "stop and frisk"
situations, the arrest of a suspect, or possibly the criminal occurrence;" 16
and (3) its use in the station-house to record lineup procedures.
In light of the issues raised by the Miranda warnings as to the volun-
tariness of a confession and the Escobedo17 case regarding right to coun-
sel, these police uses must be examined for possible violations of the con-
stitutional rights of the accused. Examination of the three types of cases is
necessary in order to determine whether an unconstitutional violation of
rights in videotape investigation has occurred: (1) right to counsel: (2)
privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) right to privacy.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL PROBLEMS IN VIDEOTAPING
AN IDENTIFICATION OR INTERROGATION
The right to counsel in criminal prosecutions is a constitutional man-
date.' 18 In 1932, the Supreme Court interpreted this right to include
"effective assistance of counsel" 1 9 in cases where the defendant through
"ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like" was rendered incap-
able of carrying out his own defense. Extended to all indigent defend-
ants in federal courts in 1948,120 the standard of application as to when
the right matured was enunciated in Hamilton v. Alabama;'2' as soon as
115. National Shorthand Reporters Association, Experiences with Electronic Re-
porting, HANDBOOK ON ELECTRICAL REPORTING (1965).
116. Proper placement of videotape camera stations during the 1968 Democratic
Convention riots in Chicago, Illinois would have done much either to discourage
criminal acts within the view of the cameras or in the event of such conduct provide
evidence for an effective prosecution.
117. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
119. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
120. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
121. 368 U.S. 52 (1961). Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) over-
ruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which held that the sixth amendment
right to counsel did not apply to state prosecutions.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the proceedings reached a "critical stage,' 22 the right attached. The ques-
tion in identification cases regarding the right to counsel is whether the
identification is itself a "critical stage?"
It was against this background that the cases of United States v.
Wade,1 23 Gilbert v. California,1 24 and Stovall v. Denno125 were decided.
In United States v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court held (5-4)
that a federal judgment convicting defendant Wade of bank robbery should
be vacated because he had been required to appear in a post-indictment
lineup without the presence of his counsel or a valid waiver thereof-
which lineup was therefore conducted in violation of defendant's sixth
amendment rights. In Gilbert v. California, the High Court held (6-3)
that a state court judgment convicting defendant Gilbert of murder and
armed robbery should be vacated because of the admission during the
prosecution's case in chief of evidence of a post-indictment lineup in which
defendant had been required to appear without the presence of his coun-
sel or a valid waiver thereof-such admission being per se erroneous-
and that the judgment should be reversed unless it was determined upon
remand that the error was harmless. The case of Stovall v. Denno
involved a witness who was confined to a hospital bed, close to death.
As there was no time in which to stage a lineup or notify defendant's
counsel, a "showup," or face-to-face identification, was used. The Court,
reasoning that since the only witness was in extremis, these facts consti-
tuted an exception to the general rule of Wade-Gilbert.
In any examination of right-to-counsel problems arising from the video-
taping of lineup proceedings, it is necessary to distinguish between the
following situations: (1) videotaping the lineup occurrence and any as-
sociated identification of the defendant; (2) showing a videotape of a
previously staged lineup to a witness who was not available at the time
of the original lineup; and (3) videotaping an identification made from a
showing of a previously recorded lineup.
In the first case, the use of videotape would present no right-to-counsel
problems, assuming that the proceedings were conducted according to the
Wade-Gilbert rules. In fact, videotape of this occurrence would be bene-
122. The "critical stage" concept has been shaped by the cases of Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 117; and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
123. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
124. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). For an extention of the Wade-Gilbert rules to pre-
indictment lineups, see People v. Fowler, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643 (1969),
noted in 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 789 (1970).
125. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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ficial to defendant in cases where the witness had been prejudiced by
police conduct, as a permanent record would be available to support a
subsequent motion to suppress. Similar reasoning would apply to situa-
tion three, supra, assuming that counsel were present at the original line-
up. It is in situation two where a recording of a proper lineup procedure
is made in the presence of counsel, but may later be shown to witnesses
for identification when counsel is not present. Does this procedure vio-
late defendant's right to counsel?
By the rationale of United States v. Collins,126 where identification of
the defendant was made from a showing of photographs taken at a prop-
erly conducted lineup, use of videotaped lineups for later identification
would not violate defendant's sixth amendment rights. The court rea-
soned that, as counsel had been present at the original proceeding, any
subsequent showing of the events of this proceeding would be within the
standards enunciated in Simmons v. United States.127  Applying this rea-
soning to the use of videotape, rather than photographs, it becomes ap-
parent that the holding of Collins is applicable to videotape. In fact,
since videotape is a complete sequential record of the events of the line-
up, rather than a recording of several isolated events, as with photographs,
it is subject to a far lower probability of abuse, and in fact encourages
law enforcement officials to behave in a constitutionally proper fashion.
The presence of a clock or similar timing device in the videotape record
would prevent "editing" of the record to conceal questionable circum-
stances from later judicial discovery.
It has been argued that the possibility for abuse still exists, even with
a full videotape recording of the events of a lineup, since prejudicial con-
duct would occur beyond the range of the camera or before the witness
has entered the lineup room. These objections are true, but are not use-
ful, for these abuses could occur even more easily in the absence of a
videotape record. In short, there is no system devised by man which
cannot be circumvented; it is incumbent upon the legal profession, how-
ever, to discover and use those systems which are subject to the least
abuse.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the United
126. 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969), followed in: United States v. Cunningham,
423 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1970); Searles v. Minnesota, 428 F.2d 1188 (8th Cir.
1970); and United States v. Canty, 430 F.2d 1333 (4th Cir. 1970).
127. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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States Constitution128 and has been made applicable to the states by in-
corporation under the fourteenth amendment. 129  Recent decisions of the
Supreme Court in this area have provoked a sea of controversy. Such
jurists and legal scholars as Judge Henry Friendly and Justices Walter
Schaefer and Roger Traynor have been critical of fifth amendment deci-
sions by the court.'3 This criticism has recently led to proposals for
constitutional amendment by Judge Friendly, 3 ' who would retain the pri-
vilege at trial, but remove it in pre-trial interrogation or investigation. 1 2
Judge Friendly bases his argument on the fact that the policies behind
the privilege have never been sufficiently explained; if they have been
spelled out, they are meaningless 13 3 or are better protected by first amend-
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
129. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965) overruling Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
130. See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,
BENCHMARKS 235 (1967); Friendly, A Postscript on Miranda, id., at 266; SCHAEFER,
THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY (1967); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow:
The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 671 (1968); Traynor,
The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U.
CiI. L. REV. 657 (1966).
131. Cf. Thompson, Judge Friendly's Amendment to the Fifth Amendment: A
Comment on Recent Criticism of the Supreme Court, 38 U. CINN. L. REV. 488, 522
(1969).
132. He suggests that the privilege not prohibit:
(1) Interrogating any person or requesting him to furnish goods or chattels,
including books, papers, and other writings, without warning that he is
not obligated to comply, unless such person has been taken into custody be-
cause of, or has been charged with, a crime to which the interrogation or
request relates.
(2) Comment by the judge at any criminal trial on previous refusal by the
defendant to answer inquiries relevant to the crime before a grand jury or
similar investigating body, or before a judicial officer charged with the
duty of presiding over his interrogation, provided that he shall have been
afforded the assistance of counsel when being so questioned and shall have
then been warned that he need not answer; that if he does answer, his
answer may be used against him in court; and that if he does not answer, thejudge may comment on his refusal. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment To-
morrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 671,
721-22 (1968). Judge Friendly's proposed amendment would also allow
compulsory production of documents and other tangible objects; dismissal of
government employees or de-licensing of persons licensed by the state for
refusal to give information relevant to their performance of duties; requiring
a suspect to identify himself and make himself available for physical exam-
ination; and compulsory registration under specified circumstances. Id. at
722. See also supra note 131.
133. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, supra note 130, at 686-87.
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ment provisions dealing with freedom of speech or freedom of religion.' 3 4
Undoubtedly, much of the reason for the privilege originated with the
activities of the High Commission and the Star Chamber. The dilemma
of the witness in such situations is illustrated by the statement of Sir Thomas
Tresham, who, when brought before the Star Chamber on the charge of
harboring the Jesuit, Edmond Campion, stated: "[I]f I sweare falselie,
I am perjured; if by me othe I accuse myselfe, I am condemned to the
penaltie of the law . . . . If I sweare trulie, then I laye myself wyde open
• . . to perjurie, because Mr. Campion hath opporitely accused me in the
affirmatyve.' 35 The privilege against self-incrimination, then, does serve
a valid purpose in interrogation proceedings-that of preventing injury
to a defendant's case whether he swears affirmatively or negatively.
In order to determine whether videotaping an accused in a lineup pro-
ceeding constitutes a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination,
it is necessary to examine under what circumstances the accused is deemed
to have given "testimony" against himself. The cases have drawn a sharp
distinction between verbal testimony extracted from a person, in which
case he would truly be a "witness" against himself and using the "body"
as (real or physical) evidence where it may be material.'8 6 Under
this reasoning, only an individual's "communications" are protected by
the fifth amendment.137  Examples of physical evidence are compulsory
fingerprinting, voice-print identification, writing samples, blood tests,
breath analysis, photographs of the accused, and body measurements. The
Illinois courts have held that evidence derived from a compulsory line-
up' 88 or other physical examination of a suspect's body13 9 is not consti-
tutionally inadmissible.
It may be argued that, even though recording a person's image on
videotape may not constitute an infringement of the accused's fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, any words spoken by the sus-
134. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CRIM. L. REV. 671, 696-97 (1968).
135. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FnT AMENDMENT 103 (1968).
136. Holt v. United States, 404 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1086 (1969), reh. denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969).
137. In his dissent in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), Mr. Jus-
tice Black criticizes the "communication" or testimony guideline. In a case which
involved mandatory extraction of blood from an arrestee in order to determine
the alcohol level in his blood, Mr. Justice Black asks: "How can it reasonably be
doubted that the blood test evidence was not in all respects the actual equivalent of
'testimony' taken from petitioner when the result of the test was offered as testi-
mony, was considered by the jury as testimony, and the jury's verdict of guilt rests
in part on that testimony?" Id. at 778.
138. People v. Blewitt, 75 Ill. App. 2d 281, 221 N.E.2d 135 (1966).
139. People v. Finney, 88 Ill. App. 2d 204, 232 N.E.2d 247 (1967).
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pect will be protected as his "communications." This argument must be
rejected, however, since the suspect's spoken words are not utilized to
convey information, but are merely for the purpose of comparison of their
tonal quality with the voice remembered by the witness. Thus, in video-
taped lineup situations those who have been compelled to appear there-
in can not object that they are being forced to incriminate themselves.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment 140 prevents the use of testimony which is ob-
tained by unreasonable means; admissibility is to be determined by an
evaluation of the motivating probable cause, the scope of the search, the
methods and means used to effectuate the search, and the type of evi-
dence sought.14 ' Although judicial guidelines are lacking in the area
of videotape use, an examination of the right of privacy, including cases
involving electronic surveillance, would aid in determining whether use of
videotape would violate the constitutional rights of the suspect.
Although the courts have recognized conversations to be constitution-
ally protected by the fourth amendment, no similar protection has been
granted to the seizure of one's image. The cases involving electronic sur-
veillance have thus far dealt only with listening and audio-recording de-
vices.
Katz v. United States,' 42 in overturning a long line of eavesdropping
and electronic surveillance cases,' 43 held that the fourth amendment pro-
140. For a discussion of the right of privacy, see Warren and Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 5 (1890); MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY
(1970); Ashman, Book Review, 20 DE PAUL L. REV. - (1971).
141. The Supreme Court, in accepting "reasonableness" as the standard to be
applied in "stop and frisk" situations, has eroded traditional standards of probable
cause in search and seizure cases. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
142. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1966).
The Court in Katz stated: "Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amend-
ment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the re-
cording of 'oral statements, overheard without any technical trespass under ...
local property law." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511. Once this
much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures,
it becomes clear that the reach of the Amendment cannot turn upon the presence
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. We conclude that the
underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent
decisions that the 'trepass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as
controlling. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at -.
143. Katz v. United States, supra note 142, expressly overruled Olmstead v.
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tects people and not property, because it embodies a fundamental right
of privacy. This "person" rule expressly replaced the "tresspass rule,"
which theorized that as long as there was no physical intrusion into the
property of the suspect, his right to privacy was not violated.' 44  Apply-
ing the reasoning of Katz to videotape cases, the question is whether
the right to one's image is absolute or is conditional, being subject to
seizure without a warrant when the suspect is in a public place and with
a warrant when he is in a private place. Katz would permit videotape
use only with a warrant. It is quite probable, however, that for searches
in private areas, a higher standard than reasonableness, that of probable
cause, would be required. 145  In non-surveillance situations where video-
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Wire connections to defendant's telephone
produced extensive evidence. This surveillance was considered to be outside the
fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, as there was no
physical intrusion onto defendant's property, nor was there the seizing of any ma-
terial object belonging to defendant. A similar view was expressed in Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), which held that the use of a sound amplifying
device did not violate the fourth amendment, as there was no "trespass." This
trespass aspect of the Ohmstead case was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Taft as
follows: "The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-
the person, the house, his papers, or his effects. The description of the warrant
necessary to make the proceeding lawful, is that it must specify the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized . . . . The language of the
Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching
to the whole world from the defendant's house or office." Olmstead v. United States,
supra, at 464-65. For decisions in the area of eavesdropping and electronic surveil-
lance, see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1962); Rathburn v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370 (5th
Cir. 1968); Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1968).
For a general discussion see AMERICAN BAR Ass'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1971).
144. The "trespass rule," first expressed in Goldman v. United States, supra
note 142, was used in Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964), in which it was
determined that the device could not constitutionally be used, as the device pricked
the wall against which it was placed. It is submitted that the right of privacy cannot
be rested upon such tenuous distinctions as these. A rule similar to the "trespass
rule" is the "constitutionally protected area rule," expressed in Lanza v. New York,
370 U.S. 139 (1962). The problem with this rule is that it provides very little by
way of definiteness, is arbitrary, and would require cases covering a multitude of
factual situations before it would be a useful standard. Another alternative which
could be gleaned from the Olmstead and Goldman cases is the "risk" rule,
wherein the defendant would assume the risk that his words would be overheard.
The difficulty with this rule is that it fails adequately to define any situations where
the defendant would be able to exercise his right to privacy. As Professor Bas-
siouni has pointed out: "With today's ability to eavesdrop, there is no risk-only
virtual certainty." BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: THE LAW OF
PUBLIC ORDER 398 (1969).
145. It should not be forgotten that an exclusionary rule would be applied to
any videotapes which were made in violation of defendant's rights under the fourth
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
tape is used, such as the recording of confessions, lineups, and trial-rec-
ord situations, the objection of invasion of privacy and the resulting dep-
rivation of fourth-amendment rights do not apply, since there is no ele-
ment of secrecy involved and the subject's express or implied consent
may be assumed.
CONCLUSION
In an era vastly in need of new technology and judicial innovation,
videotape has shown itself to be a flexible tool for use both in the court-
room and by the police. Although there are valid objections regarding
its use in certain situations where abuse or deprivation of constitutional
rights potentially may occur, such as surveillance situations, it must not
be forgotten that the instrumentality used is not responsible for the viola-
tions of personal liberty which may occur-the individual members of
the investigative or judicial bodies utilizing the equipment are solely re-
sponsible for any unconstitutional use. Therefore, useful applications of
videotape should not be curtailed merely because potentials for abuse ex-
ist in these areas. When abuses occur, it should not automatically be
assumed that the greater justice is done if the evidence gained thereby
is excluded, which would in many areas prevent effective use of techno-
logical advances. There may be something to be said for the objective
principle of "truth," as opposed to the subjective concept of "justice."
As videotape is real evidence, it is, if relevant, an important factor in any
determination of truth. Perhaps the problem lies with our adversary sys-
tem of justice. But even in an adversary system, as the then Judge Car-
dozo stated, "[t]he criminal ... [should not] ...go free because the
constable has blundered.' 146 As with any technological innovation, prob-
lems exist with respect to videotape use; however, the great potential of
videotape should not be lost to the system, nor should needless delay be
permitted. In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in ref-
erence to judicial reform as a whole, but equally applicable to the specific
innovation of videotape: "Why should it take so long?"
Robert M. Ward
amendment. For an articulate criticism of the exclusionary rule, see Bums, Mapp v.
Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 80 (1969).
146. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 22, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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